The University of the Pacific Law Review
Volume 47
Issue 2 Symposium: The Promise and Perils of an
International Law of Property

Article 9

1-1-2016

European and International Intellectual Property
Law between Propertization and Regulation: How
a Fundamental-Rights Approach Can Mitigate the
Tension
Josef Drexl
Director of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition in Munich

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uoplawreview
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Josef Drexl, European and International Intellectual Property Law between Propertization and Regulation: How a Fundamental-Rights
Approach Can Mitigate the Tension, 47 U. Pac. L. Rev. 199 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uoplawreview/vol47/iss2/9

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in The University of the Pacific Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.

European and International Intellectual Property Law
between Propertization and Regulation: How a
Fundamental-Rights Approach Can Mitigate the Tension
Josef Drexl*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 199

II. SOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PROPERTY CLAIM FOR IP AND
THE REGULATORY CHARACTER OF IP ......................................................... 202
A. No Intellectual Property without Legislation ........................................ 202
B. Attaining Regulatory Goals through IP Legislation ............................. 203
III. THE ANALOGY TO TANGIBLE PROPERTY .................................................... 206
IV. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY .................................................................................................... 208
V. THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY .................................................................................................... 209
A. The Procedural Context ........................................................................ 209
B. Interpretation of Directives in Copyright Cases ................................... 210
1. The European Parody Exception .................................................... 211
2. Copyright Liability of Internet Access Providers ........................... 214
C. IP and Competition Law: The Case of Standard-Essential Patents...... 216
D. Summary of the Case Law ..................................................................... 217
VI. CONCLUSION FOR INTERNATIONAL IP LAW ................................................ 218
I. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property (IP) has become a political battleground. This is also
true for international IP law. Technologically advanced countries advocate and
press for ever-higher standards of IP protection with the objective of enhancing
their competitiveness in international markets against the growing economic
1
power of emerging and developing countries. At the same time, it becomes more
* Ph.D. in law (Munich), LL.M. (UC Berkeley), Director of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and
Competition in Munich; Honorary Professor at the University of Munich; Member of the Bavarian Academy of
Sciences; Chair of the Managing Board of the Munich Intellectual Property Law Center (MIPLC).
1. Whether such a policy can really be successful is critically reviewed by Josef Drexl, The Concept of
Trade-Relatedness of Intellectual Property Rights in Times of Post-TRIPS Bilateralism, in TRIPS PLUS 20—
FROM TRADE PRINCIPLES TO MARKET RULES (Reto M. Hilty et al., eds., forthcoming) (reviewing the policy of
developed countries, including the U.S. in particular, with regard to the inclusion of IP in the law of the World
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difficult for emerging and developing countries to maintain their own flexibility
and regulatory autonomy in designing their own IP laws that more adequately
respond to their innovation potentials. In addition, inclusion of IP in multilateral
and, more recently, bilateral trade agreements has increased awareness of how
much IP affects the daily life of human beings worldwide. In particular, IP may
restrict access—especially of the poor—to education as well as essential goods
such as medicine, seeds, and food. Therefore, IP in the global arena is also highly
debated from a human-rights perspective. In this debate, proponents of strong IP
protection rely on IP as property and sometimes even equate insufficient
2
protection and enforcement in other countries with “intellectual property theft.”
In contrast, non-governmental organizations and emerging and developing
countries invoke the social rights of individuals in order to guarantee and
maintain sufficient access to certain goods.
This article discusses the strength of the “property claim” for justifying
demands for higher levels of IP protection on the international level. In doing so,
it takes inspiration from more recent case law in the European Union (EU) on the
constitutional status of IP as “property,” based on the Charter of Fundamental
3
Rights (CFR) of 2000.
However, the basis of the “property claim” on the international level is not so
clear. Use of the term “property” in “intellectual property” by itself cannot serve
as a foundation for international human rights protection of IP. Such a basis is
provided by the often-cited Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDCR) of 1948, which states that “everyone has the right to the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
4
literary or artistic production of which he is the author.” Yet this provision, in
light of both its wording and its systematic context, seems surprisingly unrelated
5
to the general clause on property protection contained in Article 17 UDCR. The
Trade Organization, in the form of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) and later inclusion of IP rules in bilateral trade agreements). The advancement of IP standards in
bilateral trade agreements of the EU is reviewed in EU BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY—FOR BETTER OR WORSE? (Josef Drexl et al., eds. 2014).
2. See COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP., COMMISSION REPORT (2013), available at
http://www.ipcommission.org/report/ip_commission_report_052213.pdf (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review). This Commission, whose members are mostly former government officials and
politicians, is a private initiative that makes recommendations to the U.S. government. The focus of the report is
on IP infringement of U.S. right-holders in China. Id.
3. Through the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009, the CFR has become an
integral part of the EU Treaties. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 6(1)(1), Oct.
26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326/13) [hereinafter TEU].
4. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter UCHR]. See also JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 101
(2014).
5. See Josef Drexl, Constitutional Protection of Authors’ Moral Rights in the European Union—Between
Privacy, Property and the Regulation of the Economy, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW—PRIVACY AS
AUTONOMY 159, 167–71 (Katja S. Ziegler ed. 2007) (on the distinction between the approach of Article 27(2)
UCHR and the property approach to IP). It is also to be noted that only original authors and inventors seem to
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same is true for the recognition of protection of the results “from any scientific,
literary or artistic production” in Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant
6
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966. Nevertheless,
specific multilateral IP treaties make explicit reference to the property concept.
Most importantly, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
of 1883 uses the term “property” for rights such as patents, trademarks, and even
7
for protection against unfair competition. In contrast to the UDHR and the
ICESCR, Article 16(2) of the CFR as a document on general human rights
protection integrates IP in the framework of the general property provision and
8
thereby provides that “[i]ntellectual property shall be protected.”
Of course, Article 16(2) is in need of interpretation. It is not clear whether
this clause is intended to lay the foundation for a natural-rights approach,
obliging the state to protect pre-existing property rights. Indeed, the “property
9
claim” for IP is rejected by others. According to this view, IP is only seen as a
means to an end; as a regulatory instrument of market intervention, IP laws are
only adopted to create incentives for innovation and creativity, and, thereby, to
10
promote economic growth in the public interest.
This article will first argue that there is no inherent conflict between the two
concepts of IP as a property right, and IP as a regulatory tool. Then, it will
explain that IP is not substantially different from real property, at least in regards
to the principles that define the scope of protection and the possibility to limit
protection, both in the public interest and the private interest of others using the
11
subject-matter of protection. The article will then analyze the European
12
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) —the basis for the first European
discussion of the scope of IP rights as fundamental property rights—and then
13
turn to the CFR. Based on this analysis, the article will finally draw conclusions
14
for international IP law.

be able to rely on Article 27(2) of the UCHR, whereas the assignee of IP rights could also rely on the property
concept as a fundamental right.
6. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 15(1)(c), Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
7. In this context, the use of the term stems from the French term “propriété industrielle,” as a result of
the natural-rights approach to IP that emerged from the French Revolution.
8. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 16(2), Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364/01)
[hereinafter CFR].
9. See, e.g., Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Intellectual Property Rights: From State-Initiated Restraints of
competition to State-Initiated Competition, in STATE-INITIATED RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION 261, 264–66
(Josef Drexl et al., eds. 2015).
10. Id. at 265.
11. Infra Part III.
12. Infra Part IV.
13. Infra Part V.
14. Infra Part VI.
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II. SOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PROPERTY CLAIM FOR IP AND THE
REGULATORY CHARACTER OF IP
This part of the article will show that there is no real conflict between the
property claim for IP and the regulatory concept of IP. The property claim, by
itself, cannot justify any extension of IP protection, nor does the regulatory
concept of IP argue against a constitutional property concept of IP. The solution
can be found in how IP, as property, should correctly be constructed from a
constitutional perspective.
A. No Intellectual Property without Legislation
While intellectual property can theoretically and philosophically be
perceived as a “natural” property right, it still needs to be defined by the
legislature. Unlike tangible property, which has a natural, or anthropological,
point of attachment in form of physical possession, IP protection depends entirely
upon recognition by the legislature. In providing for IP protection, the legislature
has to make a series of choices regarding the different core elements of such
protection. This includes defining the subject-matter of protection and the
threshold for protection, identifying the owner of the IP right, as well as
delimiting the scope of protection.
The natural-rights concept may play a crucial role in vesting the right in a
particular person, and in recognizing certain rights. This explains why continental
European laws grant the original copyright to the creator of a work, thereby
rejecting the work-made-for-hire doctrine and recognizing the moral rights of the
author, such as the right of integrity and the right to be named as the author. Still,
U.S. copyright law proves that these continental European laws also make a
choice, namely, by preferring the so-called droit d’auteur approach to the AngloAmerican copyright approach.
Regarding the scope of protection, IP laws need to define what exclusive
rights are granted to the right-holder, for what period of time, and to what extent
the conflicting interests of third parties are taken account of in the form of
exceptions and limitations. In short, there cannot be any IP law that does not
define its own boundaries. For the same reason, reliance on the property
paradigm as such—in the sense that IP is property and, therefore, the legislature
has to strengthen IP protection—cannot support any claim for raising the level of
IP protection. Still, IP laws may postulate a principle of high standards of
protection, as in the case of EU copyright law, which strives to provide a “high
15
level of protection.” Such claims are inspired by a natural-property concept.

15. See Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the Harmonization of
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information of Society, 2001 O.J. L 167/10 [hereinafter
Directive 2001/29/EC], recitals ¶ 4.
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But, the very fact that EU law enounces such a principle proves the legislative
choice that was made.
This analysis is also instructive for the understanding of the international
protection of IP as property. Apart from the case of unitary IP rights (e.g., the
Community trademark) granted pursuant to supranational law, property rights
only arise from national legislation. International IP agreements merely oblige
national legislatures to respect certain minimum standards of protection in the
interest of foreign right-holders, thereby limiting the autonomy and flexibility of
national legislatures regarding national IP rights. Since the rules on exceptions
and limitations are key for defining the scope of protection, these rules constitute
an integral part of the legislation on IP rights as property. Traditionally,
international IP agreements only take exceptions and limitations into account by
authorizing states to limit the scope of protection in certain regards. However, the
fact that states enjoy flexibility with regard to exceptions and limitations—
without having any obligation to provide for such rules—merely proves that IP
rights as property rights arise from national legislation. It was only more recently
that international obligations to introduce maximum standards of protection (socalled “ceilings”) have been enacted under the Marrakesh Treaty on Visually
16
Impaired People. Such binding ceilings constitute international IP law defining
the international standard of IP protection.
B. Attaining Regulatory Goals through IP Legislation
The property paradigm cannot answer the question of how IP law, and hence,
property rights, should be designed. Such an answer can only be given in light of
the regulatory goals of IP law. Two considerations play a role in this regard.
First, the very introduction of IP rights must be justified in light of the objectives
of intellectual property protection. The U.S. Constitution clearly points this out
by stating that Congress has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
17
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Under this provision,
Congress’ legislative power seems to end where IP law no longer enhances, but
18
rather, hampers innovation and creativity. Indeed, the assumption that more
16. WIPO, Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind,
Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, opened for signature on June 27, 2013, WIPO Doc. VIP/DC/8
(July 31, 2013) [hereinafter Marrakesh Treaty]. For more discussion on this agreement, see Marketa Trimble,
The Marrakesh Puzzle, 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 768 (2014); see also Simonetta Vezzoso, The
Marrakesh Spirit—A Ghost in Three Steps, 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 796 (2014).
17. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. This, however, does not answer the question of how much discretion Congress has in making such an
assessment. On the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, the majority of
the U.S. Supreme Court declined to accept the plaintiff’s argument that retroactive extension of the term of
protection for protected works would not produce any positive incentives on authors to produce new works. See
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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19

protection will lead to more innovation and creativity is not true. In particular,
expanding protection may reduce dynamic competition by making it more
difficult for competitors to enter the market, thereby decreasing the right-holders’
20
own incentives to invest in further research and development.
Second, the legislature should also take account of the costs of IP protection
21
to society. IP protection may incentivize innovation and creativity, but these
advantages may be outweighed by the exclusionary effects of such protection on
22
consumers who can no longer afford to buy the respective products.
Also, the regulatory function of IP protection matters for the understanding
of international IP law. The costs and benefits of IP protection are distributed
23
very unequally across different countries. Patent protection may exercise more
incentives for innovation in technologically advanced countries. In contrast,
access costs are higher in poorer countries, which, for instance, cannot finance
24
general healthcare and access to essential medicine. Therefore, the economic
cost-benefit analysis of IP seems to argue in favor of promoting national tradeoffs, and, hence, full flexibility of national legislatures to design their IP systems
according to their needs.
Yet this analysis ignores the fact that markets in a globalized world become
more integrated, and that goods implementing the subject-matter of protection
can often easily be traded across borders. With full national autonomy comes the
risk that some countries would implement sub-optimal IP legislation that allow to
free-ride on the incentives for innovation arising from higher standards of
protection in other countries. Hence, there is an argument for international
standards of protection. However, there is no support for full harmonization of IP
25
law. Such harmonization would only be appropriate in a fully integrated world
19. See Peritz, supra note 9, at 266 (arguing that simply as a matter of logic it is not possible to conclude
that increasing means will increase the end).
20. The latter effect can also be produced by retroactive extension of the term of protection. See supra
note 18 and accompanying text. Without expiry, right-holders could rely on continued protection of existing
works and products and would be less likely to invest in the creation of new works and the development of new
and better products. In this regard, expiry of the term of protection forms an integral part of the incentive
structure for innovation of patent law. A pharmaceutical company that knows the patent for a blockbuster drug
will soon expire will feel more incentive to invest heavily in research and development to maintain the firm’s
profitability based on a portfolio of patented drugs conferring a sufficient degree of market power.
21. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 16–24 (2003).
22. The so-called “property rights theory” of economics explains IP production as a trade-off. According
to this theory, IP protection should be designed so as to maximize social welfare (economic efficiency), which
requires taking into account the costs caused by the exclusionary effect of protection. See id.
23. See id at 18–19.
24. Id.
25. From the perspective of political economy, it cannot be assumed that full harmonization would meet
the international trade-off. Even in multilateral negotiations the more-economically powerful states could
manage to push through a level of protection above this trade-off. This problem is even more acute in the case
of bilateral agreements, where developing countries find themselves in particularly weak bargaining positions.
The law of powerful trading nations even prescribes that the national standard of IP protection should be
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market. Such a market, however, does not exist; neither World Trade
Organization law nor bilateral trade agreements establish such a market for IPrelated products. In particular, these agreements do not provide for cross-border
exhaustion of IP rights, and consequently, they still allow national laws to
26
empower right-holders to prevent parallel imports. The situation is only
different in systems of economic integration based on principles of internal
exhaustion. This explains why, in the EU, both principles of exhaustion and
harmonization of IP rights are applied. Since IP has become just one issue states
agree upon in much broader trade agreements, there is even a risk that states will
trade concessions in IP for benefits in other unrelated fields of trade. This should
not be criticized in general; but it may be difficult for national decision-makers to
assess the costs and benefits of such agreements. The inclusion of IP in more
comprehensive trade agreements may lead to an expansion of the international
27
standard of IP law that is not justified in light of the regulatory function of IP.
To conclude, it should be noted that the concept of IP as a form of regulation
relies on IP as property to achieve its own regulatory objectives. The regulatory
dimension of IP highlights the particular need to limit IP protection to attain a
trade-off between incentives for innovation and creativity deriving from IP
protection and the social costs of such protection. The property claim cannot
justify a deviation from that trade-off. Even within the framework of
international IP law, it remains the task of national IP law to define property
rights. International law should only pursue some harmonization; namely, to
prevent free-riding on the incentives for innovation and creativity arising from
the law of countries with higher levels of protection.

implemented in international agreements. For instance, the U.S. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of
2002 obligates U.S. negotiators to ensure that “the provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement
governing intellectual property rights that is entered into by the United States reflect a standard of protection
similar to that found in United States law.” Trade Act of 2002, H.R. 3009, 107th Cong., § 2102(a)(4)(A)(i)(II)
(2002).
26. TRIPS safeguards the freedom of World Trade Organization Members to make autonomous decisions
on the issue of exhaustion. See Josef Drexl, EU Competition Law and Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals:
Lessons to be Learned for WTO/TRIPS?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE CROSSROADS OF TRADE 3, 16–18
(Jan Rosén ed. 2012) (arguing against exhaustion as a principle of international trade law since it would weaken
the policy of poorer countries that try to promote the interest of their citizens in accessing essential goods such
as drugs).
27. Such concerns convinced the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition to elaborate a set
of principles on how decision-makers on the different levels of negotiating and implementing bilateral
agreements should deal with demands for higher IP standards. See Josef Drexl et al., Principles for Intellectual
Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, 44 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 878
(2013).
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III. THE ANALOGY TO TANGIBLE PROPERTY
Proponents of the property claim for IP also seem to equate intellectual
property with tangible property. According to them, IP infringements are a
28
particular form of theft.
Yet there are considerable differences between the theft of a tangible object
and the infringement of IP. The use of another person’s copyright or patent does
not prevent the right-holder from continuing her own use. Hence, “intellectual
property theft,” for the most part, only affects the financial interests of the rightholder in drawing maximum profits from her property without the taking of the
object of property that characterizes the theft of tangible objects.
What is more important for the purpose of our analysis, however, is the fact
that even real property does not provide its owner unlimited protection.
Historically this may have been different when the common-law tort of trespass
provided protection against any unauthorized intrusion. Yet, already in the 19th
century U.S., population growth and progressing industrialization necessitated
balancing the interests of land owners with those of neighbors. For instance, land
owners were obliged to tolerate certain forms of interference by their neighbors’
economic operations, such as a railway companies, whose interference increased
29
social welfare.
This shows that even limitations of real property have become an inherent
feature of modern societies, enabling socially beneficial economic activities that
would otherwise be prevented when markets get too congested with property
rights. Indeed, the same problem arises in situations in which economic actors
have to invest in markets that are highly congested with IP rights and where
rights-clearing has thus become particularly difficult. For instance, the
manufacturer of a smartphone for which the use of numerous patents is required,
may easily become a victim of a patent hold-up once considerable investment has
30
been made in the production of the smartphone.

28. The concept of intellectual property theft seems to have taken hold in the public debate in the U.S., in
particular, although theft is a concept alien to IP law. For instance, the term is officially used by U.S. police
agencies. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI), Intellectual Property Theft—It’s an Age-old Crime:
Stealing, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/white_collar/ipr/ipr (last visited Nov. 18, 2015) (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). In addition, the term is extensively used by private
initiatives that advocate vigorous enforcement of IP laws against infringements both nationally and
internationally. See Christopher Burgess & Richard Power, How to Avoid Property Theft, CIO (July 10, 2006),
http://www.cio.com/article/244546/security0/how-to-avoid-intellectual-property-theft.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review); see also COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP., supra
note 2.
29. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860 101–08 (1977)
(describing the development of U.S. property law in the 19th century triggered by conflicting use of property).
30. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Hold-up and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1992
(1991) (regarding the economics of the patent hold-up problem); see also infra Part V.C. (regarding the current
development of the law on access to standard-essential patents in the EU).
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This congestion phenomenon also translates into constitutional law. The
property clauses of modern constitutions do not provide unlimited property
protection. For instance, the CFR explicitly provides that the “use of property
31
may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest.”
Beyond this, the 1946 Constitution of Bavaria even provides for an explicit
32
fundamental right of access to another person’s land. Bavaria, a state in
Germany’s south, is blessed with beautiful landscapes, including mountains. But
it is also densely populated. To guarantee its citizens free enjoyment of the state’s
natural beauty, Article 141(3) of the Bavarian Constitution provides as follows:
The enjoyment of natural beauty and recreation in the outdoors, in
particular the access to forests and mountain meadows, the use of
waterways and lakes and the appropriation of wild fruit to the extent
33
customary in the respective region shall be permitted to every person.
This provision has its peculiarities. The addressees of this right to access are
not limited to the state or other public bodies as owners of land. The right
addresses any other—even private—person owning the respective land. This has
a tremendous effect on the landscape and the accessibility of land in Bavaria.
Tourists will not encounter any fences in the forests or mountains, except those
needed to protect young plants or prevent cattle from going astray. This provision
provides an example of a very specific “users’ right” that takes precedence over
the property right of respective landowners. Again, the provision needs to be
understood as a balance of competing interests in a landscape that is highly
congested with private property rights.
This nostalgic but powerful provision of the Constitution of Bavaria not only
proves that the rights of users can considerably restrict real property. This
provision is also instructive for better understanding the case law that has
recently emerged from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). There
the Court relies on different provisions of the CFR in order to promote a balance
34
of interest in intellectual property law. Before turning to the analysis of this case
law, the jurisprudence of the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) should
also be taken into account, with regard to the application of the property
provision of the system of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
to intellectual property.

31.
32.
141(3).
33.
34.

CFR, supra note 8, at art. 17(1).
CONSTITUTION OF THE FREE STATE OF BAVARIA, Dec. 2, 1946 (as amended Nov. 10, 2003), art.
See id.
Infra Part V.
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IV. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which was concluded
between the Member States of the Council of Europe in 1950, contains no
35
express provision on intellectual property. But, the ECtHR has accepted, as a
matter of principle, that intellectual property is protected by the general property
provision of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The provision reads as follows:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by
the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions, however, shall not in any way impair the right
of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of
property in accordance with the general interest, to secure the payment of
36
taxes, other contributions, or penalties.
The most important case on intellectual property concerns a conflict between
37
trademark protection and the protection of geographic indications. In the
underlying case, Portugal had rejected registration of Anheuser Busch’s
“Budweiser” trademark, since such registration would have collided with preexisting protection of a geographic indication (GI) for breweries located in the
Czech city of Budweis (České Budějovice). Anheuser-Busch made a very farreaching claim before the Court arguing that the rejection of the registration by
the trademark office, which is required for the acquisition of the trademark,
38
violated its property rights.
The Court followed Anheuser-Busch’s line of argument to a considerable
extent, but Anheuser-Busch ultimately lost the case. The Court accepted that
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 protects not only registered intellectual property as
39
such, but even the application to register an IP right. The Court justified this by
the fact that the mere application conveys economic value; therefore, the Court
40
did not require a justified expectation that the right would finally be granted.
However, the Court found itself unable to consider rejection of the application as
41
an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possession. The Court confirmed
35.
1953).
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3,
Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, E.T.S. No. 009.
Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal (No. 73049/01), 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 39 (2007).
Id. at 57, 59.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 66–67.
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that, by giving precedence to older GI protection, the Portuguese authorities and
42
courts had only applied national law and international agreements.
In the light of fundamental rights, this judgment proves that foreign firms
cannot claim IP protection against the national and international rules of IP
legislation. Constitutional protection of IP as property requires recognition of the
specific IP right by the legislature.
V. THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR served as a template for the drafting
of the property provision in Article 17(1) of the CFR. Yet, by adding a second
paragraph stating that intellectual property is protected, the CFR explicitly
43
recognized the application of the general property clause to IP. Therefore, there
is no doubt that the Anheuser-Busch judgment is also relevant to the application
44
of the CFR. With Article 17(2), the CFR even seems to provide particularly
45
strong protection to IP. Yet, in recent case law, the CJEU has also relied on the
fundamental rights of users, alleged infringers, and even third parties, as provided
by the CFR in order to bring more balance into European IP law.
A. The Procedural Context
Regarding this more recent EU case law, it is important to understand its
procedural context. While the ECHR acts as a supranational human-rights court
that reviews the conformity of national laws, executive acts, and judgments with
the fundamental rights contained in the ECHR, the CJEU has jurisdiction to
interpret the full body of EU law. Consequently, the CJEU mostly decides cases
referred to it by national courts concerning the interpretation of both primary and
46
secondary EU law.
Most cases the CJEU decides nowadays relate to the interpretation of socalled directives that are, in principle, not directly applicable in the Member
42. Id.
43. CFR, supra note 12.
44. Note that the ECHR, as adopted within the framework of the Council of Europe, is not directly
binding on the EU. On December 18, 2014, the CJEU found the draft agreement on the accession of the EU to
the Convention incompatible with the EU Treaties, although Art. 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)
explicitly provides that the Union must accede to the Convention. See Case 2/13, Opinion Pursuant to art.
218(11) TFEU, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454 (Dec. 18, 2014). Yet the fundamental rights of the ECHR have
traditionally been recognized as part of the “general principles” of EU law that are to be respected by EU
institutions and the Member States when implementing and enforcing EU law. A reference to the ECHR was
included in the EU Treaty, even before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, stating that the Union must
respect human rights as guaranteed, inter alia, by the ECHR as general principles of Community law.
45. See Drexl, supra note 1, for an early critique.
46. Primary EU law consists of the law of the Treaties concluded by the EU Member States establishing
the EU; secondary EU law comprises the law adopted by the EU legislature based on the provisions of the
Treaties.
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States, but need to be implemented in the Member States’ national law
47
framework. The national courts are obligated to interpret national law in
conformity with the relevant directives, which enables these courts to refer
48
questions on the interpretation of directives to the CJEU. Secondary trademark
legislation quickly produced a large body of case law of the CJEU, and more
recently, a similar development has also occurred in the field of copyright law.
The CJEU has mostly relied on the CFR as guidance for the interpretation of
49
directives in the latter field of law.
Of course, national courts may also refer cases to the CJEU when they need
to know whether national law complies with treaty provisions. In such a recent
case, Advocate General (AG) Wathelet explicitly relied on the fundamental
rights of the CFR of both the patent holder and the user of the patent to bring
50
about a balance of interests of the parties involved. The central issue was
whether the grant of injunctive relief for the infringement of a standard-essential
patent under national patent law conforms to Article 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)—the EU competition rule on abuse
51
of market dominance.
B. Interpretation of Directives in Copyright Cases
As mentioned above, recent copyright cases have produced a series of
judgments in which the CJEU relied upon the CFR to promote a better balance of
interests. The nature of these cases varies quite considerably. So far, two major
52
types of cases can be identified. First, in Deckmyn, the CJEU provided an
interpretation of the parody exception to copyright protection under the
Information Society Directive, thereby relying on the fundamental rights in the
Charter to interpret a very vague term of secondary legislation. Second, the CJEU
was asked several times to apply secondary EU law in cases where copyright

47. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288(3), Dec.
13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter TFEU] (defining the concept of a directive). This article will not
further explain under which conditions directives can nevertheless be directly relied upon if a Member State
fails to adequately implement the directive. See Florian Becker & Angus Campbell, The Direct Effect of
European Directives: Towards the Final Act?, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 401 (2007) (for a more recent assessment
of direct effect under EU law); see also PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND
MATERIALS 279–87 (5th ed. 2011); Sophie Robin-Olivier, The Evolution of Direct Effect in the EU:
Stocktaking, Problems, Projections, 12 INT’L J. CONST. L. 165 (2014).
48. See TFEU, supra note 47, at art. 267 (on the referral of questions for preliminary rulings by the CJEU
concerning the interpretation of EU law). See, e.g., CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 47, at 287–96 (providing
further details on this case law concerning the interpretation of national law in conformity with directives).
49. See infra Part V.B.
50. Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp.,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2391, ¶59 (Nov. 20, 2014),
51. See the final judgment of the CJEU, Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp.,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:477 (July 16, 2015); infra Part V.C.
52. Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132, ¶¶ 3–5 (Sept. 3, 2014).
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owners sued Internet access providers to stop their customers from infringing on
copyrights. In these cases, the CJEU was confronted with the difficult task of
applying overlapping directives that pursue conflicting objectives such as
copyright protection on the one hand, and protection of personal data on the other
53
hand. Reliance on the fundamental rights in the Charter in these cases enables
the CJEU to coordinate the conflicting directives and to enhance a balance of
interests of the parties concerned.
1. The European Parody Exception
In Deckmyn, a member of the Flemish right-wing party, Vlaams Belang,
54
distributed calendars as a gift on New Year’s Day of 2011. The calendar cover
showed a copy of a cartoon from the famous “Suske en Wiske” series by the
55
Belgian cartoonist Willy Vandersteen. The principal figure on the drawing was
replaced by the mayor of Ghent flying over a city street dispersing coins.
Underneath this scene, the copier inserted people with dark skin, wearing
56
traditional Muslim clothes, who were collecting the money. The Vandersteen
heirs did not share the underlying political message, and therefore went to court
to obtain injunctive relief based on alleged copyright infringement.
Article 5(3)(k) of the Information Society Directive lists parody as an
optional limitation on copyright protection without giving any indications as to
57
how the concept of parody should be interpreted. Although Member States are
not obliged to introduce such an exception, the CJEU still held that the term
“parody,” as an autonomous concept of EU law, needs to be interpreted
58
uniformly throughout the EU. The argument was that otherwise implementation
would vary greatly between the Member States that decide to implement the
parody exception.
In response to the referring Belgian court, which had suggested rather
restrictive requirements for the concept of a parody, the CJEU advocated a broad
definition of parody. The Court only accepted the essential characteristics as part

53. This was the first case of this kind, even dating from before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force was
Promusicae v. Telefónica de España, where the referring Spanish court explicitly relied on the intellectual
property clause of the Charter and the Court responded by highlighting the need to balance the protection of
intellectual property with the protection of personal data and private life as guaranteed by arts. 7 and 8 of the
Charter. Case C-275/06, Promusicae v. Telefónica de España, 2008 E.C.R. I-271.
54. Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132.
55. In the U.S., the comics are known as “Willy and Wanda”, and in the UK, as “Spike and Suzy.” Id. at ¶
2.
56. See Philippe Laurent, The Concept of Parody and the Legitimate Interests of Parodists and Copyright
Holders, KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (Sept. 8, 2014), http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2014/09/08/the-conceptof-parody-and-the-legitimate-interests-of-parodists-and-copyright-holders/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (providing pictures of the original cartoon).
57. Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132, at ¶¶ 14–15.
58. Id. at ¶ 16.
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of a literal understanding of parody; namely, “first, to evoke an existing work
while being noticeably different from it, and, secondly, to constitute an
59
expression of humour or mockery.” In contrast, the Court rejected any further
requirements, including the need for parody to “display an original character of
its own, other than that of displaying noticeable differences with respect to the
original parodied work,” to be reasonably attributed to a person other than the
60
author of the original work, and to mention the source of the parodied work.
Such a broad understanding of parody was not self-evident. In particular, as a
general principle of interpretation, the Court seemed to confirm a principle of
strict interpretation of exceptions to the copyright owner’s rights under the
61
Information Society Directive. But “strict interpretation” was countered by the
other guiding principle of guaranteeing the “effectiveness of the exception” in
62
light of its objectives. In this regard, the Court recognized parody as “an
63
appropriate way to express an opinion” and, hence, the need to reach a “fair
balance” between the copyright owner’s property interest and the user’s freedom
64
of expression.
Yet the Court did not explicitly rely on the provisions of the CFR, although
copyright ownership is protected under Article 17(2) and the freedom of
65
expression under Article 11(1) CFR. This can be explained by the fact that the
rights of the parties weighed by the Court were also referred to in the recitals to
66
the Directive.
Against the broad understanding of the parody concept, one would expect
that the Court would give precedence to the person relying on the exception.
Still, the Court gave the judgment another twist by also taking into account the
right of non-discrimination based on grounds of race, color, or ethnic origin in
67
Article 21(1) CFR. This seems astonishing in many regards. First, the persons
who could invoke this right were not parties to the dispute. Second, the Court
appeared to be taking sides in the political debate on immigration, whereas
respect of freedom of expression should argue for political neutrality of the
Court. And third, the Court seemed to be imposing a uniform understanding on
how far the law should intervene in the control of political opinions, although
attitudes among the Member States vary considerably in this regard.

59. Id. at ¶ 20.
60. Id. at ¶ 21 (referring court had asked whether such additional characteristics are required for parody).
61. Id. at ¶ 22.
62. Id. at ¶ 23.
63. Id. at ¶ 25.
64. Id. at ¶¶ 26–27.
65. Id. at ¶ 25.
66. Id. at ¶ 25; see Directive 2001/29, recital 2–4, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
May 2001 on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information
Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10.
67. Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132, at ¶ 30.
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These counter-arguments however overlook an important aspect of the
Court’s reasoning that brings the judgment back onto firmer grounds of copyright
law: the Court relied upon Article 21(1) of the CFR to argue a “legitimate interest
[of the author of the work] in ensuring that the work protected by copyright is not
68
associated with such a message.” Hence, the Court did not impose any opinion
on the person relying on the parody exception. Rather, it aimed to protect the
work against assimilation with a political opinion that the author of the work
would not have supported. It is important to remember that the plaintiffs did not
pursue any monetary interest, but rather, they sought a permanent injunction
against the use of the work. Accordingly, beyond interpreting the parody concept,
the Deckmyn judgment has to be considered a case on moral-rights protection
69
under EU copyright law. Of course, others could argue that the Court simply
aimed at promoting the public interest in fighting discrimination, and was not
70
recognizing moral rights. Indeed, the judgment cannot be read as defining the
scope of moral rights protection in the EU for all future cases. Still, the Court
recognized the protection of moral rights in the framework of balancing the
interests of the copyright holder with those of the alleged infringer who tried to
71
rely on the parody exception. With regard to the Charter’s right against
discrimination, the judgment only shows that a right-holder has better chances of
prevailing against the parody exception when the right-holder can rely on the
general values of EU law and the rights of third persons, as enshrined in the
Charter. The Deckmyn judgment also proves that reliance on the Charter does not
help only the user or alleged infringer. It may go either way, especially if the
rights of third parties enter the picture. Ultimately, the judgment did not provide
much guidance to the referring court, since the CJEU left it to the referring court
72
to decide whether the parody exception applied in the underlying case. In
addition, the CJEU’s criteria remain rather contradictory and, therefore, fail to
provide clear guidance for national courts. On one hand, it seems that the broadly
defined parody exception is fulfilled. But on the other hand, the Court seems to
give particular weight to the legitimacy of the right-holder’s moral interest in
preventing the use of the work.

68. Id. at ¶ 31.
69. This is also highlighted in Eleonora Rosati, Just a Laughing Matter? Why the Decision in Deckmyn is
Broader than Parody, 52 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 511 (2015).
70. See Nadine Klass, Werkgenuss und Werknutzung in der digitalen Welt: Bedarf e seiner
Harmonisierung des Urheberpersönlichkeitsrechts?, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER-UND MEDIENRECHT 290, at
293–94 (2015).
71. This is not a new development. Moral rights have been recognized in principle by the Court as part of
the specific subject matter of protection of copyright law. See Case C-92/92, Phil Collins v. Imtrat
Handelsgesellschaft, 1993 E.C.R. I-5145, at ¶ 20.
72. Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132, ¶ 32 (Sept. 3, 2014).
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2. Copyright Liability of Internet Access Providers
For the purposes of this article, the most interesting cases so far concern the
availability of injunctions against Internet access providers according to Article
73
8(3) of the Information Society Directive. This provision obliges Member States
to ensure that right-holders “are in a position to apply for an injunction” against
such intermediaries “whose services are used by a third party to infringe a
copyright or related right.” The very wording of this provision hints at the need
to balance the interests of different persons. On one hand, there is an obvious
need for interpretation, since the provision does not specify the conditions for the
availability of such injunctions. On the other hand, it is also clear that there have
to be limits on the duties of access providers, who merely provide a service that
others use for copyright infringements. And finally, even the rights of the direct
infringers come into the picture with regard to their interest in protecting their
private data.
Additionally, Article 8(3) of the Information Society Directive needs to be
coordinated with other directives, namely, the Data Protection Directive of
74
75
1995, the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, and the
76
Electronic Commerce Directive. The latter excludes a general obligation of
77
access providers to monitor the information they transmit, but still obligates
Member States to allow for rapid adoption of measures to terminate or prevent
78
infringements. Finally, the Enforcement Directive, which provides for the
availability of effective, yet proportionate, measures and remedies for the
79
protection of intellectual property also needs to be taken into account.
To date, the CJEU has decided three major cases regarding the availability of
80
injunctive relief against Internet service providers: Promusicae, Scarlet
81
82
Extended, and UPC Telekabel.

73. Directive 2001/29, supra note 15.
74. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
75. Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the
Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J.
(L 201) 37.
76. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal
Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive
on Electronic Commerce), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1.
77. Id. at art. 15(1).
78. Id. at art. 18(1).
79. Directive 2004/48/EC, art. 3(2), of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on
the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 OJ (L 157) 45; Corrigendum to Directive 2004/48/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16.
80. Case C-275/06, Promusicae v. Telefónica de España, 2008 E.C.R. I-271.
81. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959.
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Promusicae related to a case where the access provider was asked to provide
83
the names of alleged infringers. For such a claim the Court recognized that
national courts are obligated to balance copyright protection with the protection
of personal data of even alleged infringers, pursuant to Article 8 of the CFR, and
according to the principle of proportionality.
In Scarlet Extended, the Court went a step further and also relied on the
fundamental right of the access provider to conduct its business as guaranteed by
84
Article 16 of the CFR. Indeed, in the case before the national court, the plaintiff
sought an order against the access provider to install a filtering system to identify
users of peer-to-peer file-sharing software, which would have been particularly
burdensome and costly for the access provider, and was not limited in scope of
85
time. Consequently, the CJEU held that the order sought by the plaintiff did not
strike a “fair balance” between the protection of intellectual property and the
86
freedom to conduct a business. The Court only cited the rights of the users of
such software with regard to the protection of their personal data and their
freedom to information (Articles 8 and 11 of the Charter) as an additional
87
argument for rejecting the order. With regard to the latter rights, the Court
stressed that the order would also prevent customers of the access provider from
88
lawfully communicating over the Internet.
At first glance, the judgment in UPC Telekabel seems to conflict with Scarlet
Extended. Although the CJEU still relied on the access provider’s freedom to
conduct a business, it held that the national court has to engage in a weighing of
interests that should result in an order against the access provider. The Court
stressed that the injunction “must be sufficiently effective to ensure genuine
89
protection” to intellectual property as a fundamental right. However, it would
go too far to interpret this judgment as a departure from Scarlet Extended, since
the Court still emphasized the need to achieve a “fair balance” between the rights
90
of both the access provider and its customers. Moreover, the facts in UPC
Telekabel differ from those in Scarlet Extended. In UPC Telekabel, the direct
infringer was a clear copyright pirate operating a website for the mere purpose of
illegally making available copyrighted movies to the public, whereas the order in
82. Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2014:192
(Mar. 27, 2014); see generally Dirk Voorhoof, Freedom of Expression and the Right to Information: Implications
for Copyright, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 331, 333–35
(Christophe Geiger ed. 2015).
83. Promusicae v. Telefónica de España, 2008 E.C.R. I-271, at ¶ 64–68.
84. Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, at ¶ 46.
85. Id. at ¶24
86. Id. at ¶¶ 47–49.
87. Id. at ¶¶ 50–52.
88. Id. at ¶ 52.
89. UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2014:192, ¶ 62 (Mar.
27, 2014).
90. Id. at ¶¶ 47, 63.
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Scarlet Extended was designed to prevent many private users of file-sharing
software from infringing copyright law. These users were also using the Internet
91
for lawful purposes. Hence, in UPC Telekabel, the direct infringer specifically
used the Internet for copyright infringements and the order sought against the
access provider was targeted at this direct infringer, and was limited in time and,
hence, it was less burdensome.
In sum, when faced with deciding the liability of Internet access providers,
courts are confronted with overlapping and largely conflicting directives that fail
to provide any guidance on how to coordinate their application. By relying on the
fundamental rights of the CFR, the CJEU is able to cut the Gordian knot and to
provide a solution that achieves a fair balance of the interests of all parties
affected by claims for injunctive relief against access providers.
C. IP and Competition Law: The Case of Standard-Essential Patents
The Court’s reliance on the CFR for achieving a better balance of interests
does not have to be limited to copyright cases or to the interpretation of
secondary law. With regard to patent law, a need to balance the rights of patent
owners with the interests of the users may arise when the latter invoke
competition law provisions of primary EU law to gain access to the use of
patents.
In cases regarding Internet access providers, the Court has relied on Article
16’s guarantee of freedom to conduct a business to justify a limitation to
intellectual property where the person relying on this freedom was not the direct
92
user of an IP right. Whether even a potential user can invoke the right to
conduct a business, with the important effect of restricting the exclusivity of the
93
IP right, may still be a very different question.
94
The CJEU was requested to decide on such a case in Huawei. The case
concerned the availability of injunctive relief to the owner of a standard-essential
patent who has committed to license at fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory
(FRAND) terms. For the technological standard in question—the fourth
generation mobile phone (Long Term Evolution, LTE) standard—several patent
95
owners hold numerous standard-essential patents. Consequently, individual
owners of such patents could try to extract excessive royalty rates by claiming
91. Compare UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH , ECLI:EU:C:2014:192, with
Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959.
92. See supra Part V.B.2.
93. Note, however, that the user’s fundamental rights were considered in the Deckmyn judgment, but in
the form of freedom of expression. See Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132, ¶¶ 27
(Sept. 3, 2014) (supporting a broad interpretation of the parody exception of EU copyright law); see also
Voorhoof, supra note 82, at 346–47.
94. Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ZTE, Corp. (July 16, 2015).
95. Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, supra note 50, at ¶ 81 (mentions 4,700 standard-essential
patents for that standard).
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injunctive relief against firms that have implemented the standard, although the
96
latter are willing to negotiate FRAND-compliant royalty rates.
In his opinion of November 20, 2014, AG Wathelet showed a good
97
understanding of the economic foundations of the case. This did not prevent
him from starting by identifying the fundamental rights of both the patent owner
and the petitioner for a license against the backdrop of their fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Charter in order to strike a balance between national patent law
and EU competition law, on which the petitioner for the license relied as a
98
defense. With regard to the rights of the petitioner for the patent, AG Wathelet
found protection in the right to conduct a business under Article 16 CFR and
concluded that the claim for injunctive relief would significantly restrict that
99
freedom and distort competition.
Ultimately, AG Wathelet advocated a solution that would enhance quick and
effective implementation of technological standards, both in the interest of the
100
potential users, and the general public.
In its judgment of July 16, 2015, the Court accepts AG Wathelet’s solution
for designing the duties that need to be fulfilled by the patent owner before
bringing an action for injunctive relief as well as by the user to avoid such an
101
action. Yet, in contrast to the Advocate General, the Court only stated the need
to balance the principle of free competition with the fundamental rights of the
patent owner—the intellectual property right under the right to effective judicial
102
protection, guaranteed by Article 17(2) and Article 47 CFR. The judgment does
not include any indication why the Court did not mention the user’s fundamental
right to conduct a business. Hence, for the time being, AG Wathelet’s recognition
of fundamental rights protection for a patent user who invokes competition law
as a defense against an IP infringement claim still needs to be confirmed by the
Court.
D. Summary of the Case Law
The analysis of the case law shows that the Charter’s fundamental rights can
guide the interpretation of European IP law. The Court engages in a balancing
approach by taking into account the guarantee of protection of intellectual

96. On the underlying economic problem of patent hold-up and royalty stacking see Lemley & Shapiro,
supra note 30.
97. Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, supra note 50.
98. Id. at ¶ 59.
99. Id.
100. Id. The approach of AG Wathelet is quite similar to that more recently taken by the U.S. Federal
Circuit Court, which applied the so-called eBay rule of the Supreme Court to deny injunctive relief to limit the
exclusivity of the standard-essential patent. See Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F. 3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
101. Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ZTE, Corp., ¶ 60–67 (July 16, 2015).
102. Id. at ¶ 42.
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property pursuant to Article 16(2) of the CFR, as well as the fundamental rights
of users, potential infringers, and third parties in order to achieve a fair balance of
interests.
More concretely, two sets of cases can be distinguished so far: First, the
CJEU uses the CFR to interpret vague terms of secondary IP legislation in the
context of exceptions and limitations. Second, the Court balances the
fundamental rights to create cohesion where different instruments of EU law
pursuing conflicting objectives overlap. The fundamental-rights approach helps
to coordinate IP protection with data protection and—at least according to AG
Wathelet—competition law, in particular.
Recognition of the right to conduct a business is a major step forward. It has
the potential to allow for universal application of the fundamental-rights
approach. Ihe CJEU initially recognized such a right as a countervailing right in
favor of Internet service providers. In Huawei, AG Wathelet followed that
reasoning also for commercial users of the IP right. Unfortunately, the Court
refrained from citing the user’s right to conduct a business as a relevant
balancing factor in its judgment.
Through this case law, the CJEU is emerging as a most active court. The
Court is indeed reconstructing IP regulation by putting itself in kind of a preregulatory situation. The CJEU is developing European IP law in cases where
vague legal provisions create room for interpretation and conflicting legal rules
need coordination. Thereby, the CJEU enhances a fair balance of interests in IP
law.
VI. CONCLUSION FOR INTERNATIONAL IP LAW
With regard to international IP law, the conclusion is rather depressing. The
analysis of the emerging constitutional approach to structuring IP law in the EU
lays open considerable defects of international IP law.
Above all, international law only creates incomplete IP law. International IP
law is still based on the principle of minimum protection. While, in the past, this
principle only created some multilateral minimum harmonization, the substantive
rules, as enshrined in the interests of right-holders in the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and more recent bilateral
trade agreements, go much further and tend to export high standards of protection
to emerging economies and developing countries. Consequently international IP
law remains incomplete because it does not sufficiently take account of the need
to balance the IP owner’s rights with appropriate exceptions and limitations.
Although most IP treaties account for the need to adopt exceptions and
limitations, such agreements usually only authorize states to implement such
rules in the interest of the users of IP rights as part of their national legislation.
These flexibilities—for instance, those in the multilateral TRIPS Agreement—
can be negotiated away by bilateral agreements.
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What can be done? International law should move from mere flexibilities
regarding exceptions and limitations to mandatory ceilings. Although limited in
scope, a first step in this direction has been taken in the Marrakesh Treaty on
103
Visually Impaired People. This treaty still needs to enter into force, and it is
unknown whether the World Intellectual Property Organization will manage to
produce other agreements of a similar kind.
For the time being, multilateral IP agreements, and even less so IP provisions
in bilateral trade agreements, are insufficient to establish a veritable international
law of intellectual property. Intellectual property as property is still a matter of
protection under national and supranational law. In view of its regulatory
objectives, such property is in clear need of confinement. International IP rules
do not provide for such confinement. On the contrary, they limit the flexibility of
states to pursue their own policies in defining the scope of intellectual property
protection.
Furthermore, a few recommendations can be formulated for the development
of international law against the backdrop of the analysis of EU law, although it is
also clear that it will be difficult to overcome the political resistance of rightholders.
In general, there is a need to promote all legal disciplines that help integrate
rules that allow for a better balance of interests, especially on the international
level. First, international dispute-settlement bodies, such as the World Trade
Organization panels and World Trade Organization Appellate Body, in
particular, should acknowledge the existence of conflicting interests when facing
complaints concerning intellectual property. Also, in several of its provisions,
TRIPS provides scope for an interpretation in light of the conflicting policy
goals. Dispute-settlement bodies should also take account of, or be inspired by,
existing agreements between the parties to the disputes that pursue the protection
104
of such conflicting interests.
With regard to IP agreements, it is very important that states maintain their
flexibilities in designing their own property systems. The current system does not
provide sufficient safeguards to prevent them from negotiating away these
flexibilities in bilateral agreements. Hence, agreements that provide for
flexibilities should also implement rules limiting the contracting parties to give
up such flexibilities in agreements with other countries. And finally, introduction
of mandatory ceilings, especially as regards exceptions and limitations to IP law,
should also be considered.

103. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79; Nagoya Protocol on
Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, Oct. 29, 2010, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 (not in force).
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